标签: foundry

据台湾的媒体（工商时报和经济日报等）报道，联电将在厦门新建8寸或者12寸厂。其实很久之前我也听说这个消息了，因为近年来联电在资本支出上远远落后于竞争对手,资金缺口很大，所以一直寻找在大陆合作，希望“不差钱”的大陆金主能够“慷慨解囊”“雪中送炭”。但传出和厦门合作的消息，作为业界中人，却是一点也看不懂。有几个问题：     1：如果是8寸，意义何在？ 目前外界说法不一，有说8寸的，也有说12寸的。目前全球代工主流是12寸（业界领先者还在研发18寸），8寸已经是落后的工艺，并且大陆的8寸也足够满足国内需求，并且从全球来看8寸有产能过剩之嫌（随着12寸的折旧期已过，很多12寸厂都在做0.11等8寸厂在做的工艺），如果厦门引入8寸工艺，并且建成生产又要在2,3年的时间，那时候8寸应该是远远供大于求，那么意义何在呢？      2:如果是12寸，12寸进入的时间点已经失去。 目前代工工艺已经发展到28纳米，大陆的中芯国际也量产40纳米，28纳米一年内也会量产；华力也即将量产55/50纳米。并且因为“台湾法令规定，台湾半导体厂若要到大陆兴建12寸厂，制程技术必须落后台湾晶圆厂至少2个世代”。联电来大陆只能生产65/55纳米工艺。而尴尬的是现在65/55纳米工艺的生命周期太短了，已经快被40纳米侵蚀掉了。而在12寸厂西进上，台湾“政府”审查很严，程序繁琐。没有4-5年的时间，几乎不可能。如果四五年后量产的话，65/55纳米工艺已经是“昨日黄花了”，市场都没有了。意义何在呢？   3:资金何来？ 据媒体说联电的预算有3亿美元（经济日报报道“联电发言体系昨（17）日表示，日前董事会通过在3亿美元（约新台币90亿元）内拟投资、参股或购买亚洲8寸或12寸晶圆厂”）。现在新建一个12寸厂需要至少30亿美元（仅仅是前期投资，不包括后续研发投入）（可以参考的是今年6月份中芯国际和北京市政府公布的方案中，一个3.5万片产能12寸厂投资总额是35.9亿美元），所以说3亿美元来新建12寸厂几乎是不可能的，除非厦门政府愿意掏出至少30亿美元。如果是8寸厂的话，现在8寸厂几乎都是二手设备，但二手设备一是时间过久，机器质量不好；而稍微好些的二手设备也非常抢手，并且后续需要补全的设备也很难买到，花费也不菲。其实3亿美元仅仅买地、修建厂房、基建等也差不多消耗掉了。没有资金，这个厂哪里来呢？   4:政府选择： 之前联电在苏州有和舰这个8寸厂，不论从厂房建设、成本控制、集群效应、人才招募以及减少部门重叠各个方面来说，苏州都是最好的选择。并且好像之前苏州在支持和舰时，一揽子协议中也有12寸的规划。不知道联电为何舍“近”求“远”，选择厦门呢？   5：厦门合适吗？ 厦门一无半导体产业基础，二无半导体代工需求，三无半导体人才积累，在这里发展代工业合适吗？难道仅仅是“目前以厦门提出的合资条件最优惠”。在这个三无的基础上，让联电不顾产业规律，不顾对别的地方的承诺，做出如此“艰难的选择”，这个筹码到底是什么呢？反过来说，付出这样的筹码，第一不是和业界最领先企业的合作（通过和业内最领先的合作，可以降低风险，对一个半导体新进入的地方政府来说，这样才能增加成功的可能性）；第二不是和国内的龙头合作（这样还可以支持国内的企业，扶持本地的产业链）。值得吗？     五个看不懂，何人能解惑？

Gartner 日前公布了2011年十大Foundry的排名，多少年来前四的位置都没怎么变化过（只不过特许换成了GF）。2011年整个晶圆代工厂的市场总额比2010年上升了5.1%，达到298亿美元。   第二的联电和第四的中芯国际市场份额都有所下滑，TowerJazz则有所上升。前十排名中，三星电子的表现很是生猛，如果把三星接获的10亿多美元苹果芯片订单也算在内的话，排名足以挤进前四。   Powerchip也进入了前十的排名，营收将近翻两倍，这主要归功于2011年初该公司从DRAM业务转向代工业务。Powerchip为Elpida代工DRAM，为Maxim代工模拟芯片。   从2009年到2010年，晶圆代工市场高速增长了40.5%，随后由于PC产品和整体消费需求的疲软，以及客户精简库存，2011年中开始代工市场保持了平缓的业务增长，增长领域主要来自平板电脑和智能手机市场。 从第一名至第十名分别为：台积电、台湾联华电子（联电）、GlobalFoundries、中芯国际、TwoerJazz、IBM微电子、 世界先进（Vanguard）、Dongbu、三星、力晶。

Much analysis and detective work have been devoted to understanding what Intel's dabbling in the foundry business means. However, trying to read those tea leaves is a fool's errand. We do not yet know how involved Intel will eventually become in the foundry market. And neither does Intel. Like my colleagues, I do not believe that Intel is poised to jump whole hog into the foundry business, competing with the likes of TSMC, UMC and Globalfoundries. The world's biggest chip vendor has in recent years dipped its toe in the foundry waters through deals with companies like Achronix, Tabula and Netronome. These firms are small, requiring production volumes that don't amount to a hill of beans compared to the mountain of Intel chips produced each day. But we've also been told that Intel's three publicly disclosed foundry customers are just the tip of the iceberg. Intel is also working as a foundry for several other companies, including some large chip vendors. We can at this point only guess at who these companies are. We also can only guess at how much Intel is charging its foundry customers for wafers. Customers, of course, bristle at the thought of discussing anything so uncouth. But it would seem a fair conclusion that Intel is charging a hefty premium, working for a set of customers (at least the publicly disclosed ones) that have everything to gain from access to Intel's unquestioned lead in process technology. For the time being, Intel's strategy appears to be to work only with those customers who benefit so much from the leading-edge process technology that they are willing to pay dearly for it. But that could change in the future. Mark Bohr, an Intel Senior Fellow who is the firm's process technology guru, told EE Times recently that Intel doesn't want to be in the general foundry business, competing against the likes of TSMC, UMC and Globalfoundries. But, at the same time, Bohr cast aspersions on the fabless-foundry model as is, claiming that the announcement that TSMC will offer only one flavour of 20-nm process technology means that Qualcomm and the like won't be able to use it. (Bohr's opinion is debatable, and neither Qualcomm nor TSMC have said anything of the sort). In a conference call with analysts following Intel's quarterly report earlier last month, Intel President and CEO Paul Otellini was fairly non-committal about the company's dabbling in foundry, describing it largely as a learning experience (albeit one that generates profit). But Otellini also said, on the subject of Intel's long term aspirations in the foundry market, "I'll leave that point open." Later, Otellini discussed the "theoretical" possibility of Intel landing a heavyweight such as Apple or Qualcomm as a foundry customer. Leaving the point open is precisely the right call. Because nobody knows yet where Intel is prepared to take this. It doesn't make sense at this point for Intel to hang its hat on foundry work to generate a sizable portion of its revenue. But Intel may yet one day decide that building wafers for other firms is easy money and set aside a larger portion of its total capacity dedicated for the purpose. The problem for Intel—or any firm that does foundry work but also builds its own products—is what happens when business is booming. When the market heats up and Intel can sell its parts faster than it can make them, will foundry customers be pushed to the back of the line? At the moment, with the small volumes required by Intel's publicly announced foundry customers, that would seem to be a non issue. But throw a customer or two the size of Qualcomm or Apple into the mix and the situation changes dramatically. Ultimately, this might prove to be the key question in how big a foundry player Intel wants to be. Because once Intel decides to sign some customers of significant size, the company has to be committed to supporting them, even at the expense of cutting into sales of its own chips. This may well prove to be a bridge further than Intel is willing to go. But there is no need for the company to make that decision now. For now, Intel gains knowledge, experience and profit while at the same time stirring the pot by being a nuisance to some of its competitors as well as the pure play foundries. How far will it go? The point remains open.

Recently, there has been much analysis and detective work dedicated to unraveling what Intel's dabbling in the foundry business means. But trying to read those tea leaves is a fool's errand. We do not yet know how involved Intel will eventually become in the foundry market. And neither does Intel. Like my colleagues, I do not believe that Intel is poised to jump whole hog into the foundry business, competing with the likes of TSMC, UMC and Globalfoundries. The world's biggest chip vendor has in recent years dipped its toe in the foundry waters through deals with companies like Achronix, Tabula and Netronome. These firms are small, requiring production volumes that don't amount to a hill of beans compared to the mountain of Intel chips produced each day. But we've also been told that Intel's three publicly disclosed foundry customers are just the tip of the iceberg. Intel is also working as a foundry for several other companies, including some large chip vendors. We can at this point only guess at who these companies are. We also can only guess at how much Intel is charging its foundry customers for wafers. Customers, of course, bristle at the thought of discussing anything so uncouth. But it would seem a fair conclusion that Intel is charging a hefty premium, working for a set of customers (at least the publicly disclosed ones) that have everything to gain from access to Intel's unquestioned lead in process technology. For the time being, Intel's strategy appears to be to work only with those customers who benefit so much from the leading-edge process technology that they are willing to pay dearly for it. But that could change in the future. Mark Bohr, an Intel Senior Fellow who is the firm's process technology guru, told EE Times recently that Intel doesn't want to be in the general foundry business, competing against the likes of TSMC, UMC and Globalfoundries. But, at the same time, Bohr cast aspersions on the fabless-foundry model as is, claiming that the announcement that TSMC will offer only one flavor of 20-nm process technology means that Qualcomm and the like won't be able to use it. (Bohr's opinion is debatable, and neither Qualcomm nor TSMC have said anything of the sort). In a conference call with analysts following Intel's quarterly report earlier last month, Intel President and CEO Paul Otellini was fairly non-committal about the company's dabbling in foundry, describing it largely as a learning experience (albeit one that generates profit). But Otellini also said, on the subject of Intel's long term aspirations in the foundry market, "I'll leave that point open." Later, Otellini discussed the "theoretical" possibility of Intel landing a heavyweight such as Apple or Qualcomm as a foundry customer. Leaving the point open is precisely the right call. Because nobody knows yet where Intel is prepared to take this. It doesn't make sense at this point for Intel to hang its hat on foundry work to generate a sizable portion of its revenue. But Intel may yet one day decide that building wafers for other firms is easy money and set aside a larger portion of its total capacity dedicated for the purpose. The problem for Intel—or any firm that does foundry work but also builds its own products—is what happens when business is booming. When the market heats up and Intel can sell its parts faster than it can make them, will foundry customers be pushed to the back of the line? At the moment, with the small volumes required by Intel's publicly announced foundry customers, that would seem to be a non issue. But throw a customer or two the size of Qualcomm or Apple into the mix and the situation changes dramatically. Ultimately, this might prove to be the key question in how big a foundry player Intel wants to be. Because once Intel decides to sign some customers of significant size, the company has to be committed to supporting them, even at the expense of cutting into sales of its own chips. This may well prove to be a bridge further than Intel is willing to go. But there is no need for the company to make that decision now. For now, Intel gains knowledge, experience and profit while at the same time stirring the pot by being a nuisance to some of its competitors as well as the pure play foundries. How far will it go? The point remains open.